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Indications from alerts or alarm systems can be the trigger for decisions, or they can elicit further 
information search. We report an experiment on the tendency to collect additional information after 
receiving system indications. We varied the proclivity of the alarm system towards false positive or false 
negative indications and the perceived risk of the situation. Results showed that false alarm-prone systems 
led to more frequent re-checking following both alarms and non-alarms in the high risk condition, whereas 
miss-prone systems led to high re-checking rates only for non-alarms, representing an asymmetry effect. 
Increasing the risk led to more re-checks with all alarm systems, but it had a stronger impact in the false 
alarm-prone condition. Results regarding the relation of risk and the asymmetry effect of false negative and 
false positive indications are discussed.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Alarm systems and decision aids support operators’ 
decision making in complex situations in numerous 
environments. Even though many systems are very good, none 
is ever 100% correct. They produce two types of errors – false 
negatives (missed detections) and false positives (false 
alarms). Threshold settings determine whether the system is 
prone to one or the other type of error.  
Error frequencies are often specified through the 
predictive values of alarm systems. The positive predictive 
value (PPV) is the ratio of true to all alarms, whereas the 
negative predictive value (NPV) represents the ratio of correct 
rejections to all non-alarms (Getty, Swets, Pickett & Gonthier, 
1995; Meyer & Bitan, 2002; Parasuraman, Hancock & 
Olofinboba, 1997). 
Designers usually follow the fail-safe approach and try to 
minimize the number of misses (i.e., they raise the NPV). 
Thus, most decision aids are false alarm-prone. However, it 
has been argued that false alarms are as bad as misses or even 
more problematic with regard to safety (Dixon, Wickens & 
McCarley, 2007). A number of studies showed not only a 
reduction of trust in the alarms, but also the behavioral 
consequence of ignoring them, due to operators’ experience of 
frequent false alarms (e.g. Bliss, Gilson & Deaton, 1995; 
Madhaven, Wiegmann & Lacson, 2006). This behavior can be 
described as lack of compliance, where compliance is 
operators’ tendency to react to an alarm as if an underlying 
problem exists. The opposite behavior – no reaction in the 
absence of an alarm, is referred to as reliance (Meyer, 2004).  
More recent studies showed that false alarms not only 
reduce compliance, but they also lower reliance, while missed 
detections only lower reliance (Dixon et al., 2007; Meyer, 
Wiczorek, & Günzler, 2014; Rice & McCarley, 2011). This 
asymmetric effect has been demonstrated on a number of 
measures. It has been referred to as the asymmetry bias, 
because the reduction of the other, non-related behavioral 
component only occurs for low PPVs, but not for low NPVs.  
A suitable countermeasure to avoid reduction of 
compliance is to offer operators the possibility to cross-check 
or re-check the alarms with additional information such as raw 
data. Instead of ignoring alarms from a system with low PPV, 
participants cross-check most of them (e.g., Bliss, Jean & 
Prioux, 1996; Manzey, Gérard &Wiczorek, 2014). 
Prior studies investigating the asymmetry bias did not use 
the re-checking option. Thus, the first aim of this study was to 
investigate, whether this type of an asymmetry effect will be 
found with regard to participants’ frequencies of re-checking 
the different types of cues when additional information is 
available, beyond the alert. 
The second aim was to explore the underlying reasons for 
the asymmetry effect. Some authors focus on the special role 
of false alarms, as they might be more salient or have a 
stronger impact on trust (Rice & McCarley, 2011; Dixon et al., 
2007). Others suppose that the reason is more related to the 
reliance component (Meyer et al., 2014). Reliance might be 
more vulnerable to changes in reliability than compliance, no 
matter whether the PPV or the NPV is diminished. One 
possible reason could be operators’ unwillingness to commit 
omission errors, if they are not certain about their response, 
because missing a critical event is usually more dangerous.  
The supposed danger of an action or of refraining from it 
depends on the perceived risk of the situation and the expected 
consequences. The impact of risk on decision making with 
alarms is still not well understood. Parasuraman and Riley 
(1997) describe risk as one important factor for reliance. 
Wiczorek and Onnasch (2012) argue that it could moderate the 
relation between system properties and decision making with 
alarms.  
Based on these theoretical assumptions, the vulnerability 
of reliance could be the reason for the asymmetry bias, and the 
variation of risk might impact on this bias as it determines the 
degree of vulnerability.   
 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the 
potential impact of risk on the asymmetry bias and its 
manifestation on the level of re-checking. Therefore, we 
compared three cuing systems with different thresholds under 
two conditions of either high or low risk in a paradigm that 
offered a re-check option.  
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Participants saw images briefly (for 1 second), and the 
cuing system provided indications. Participants could either 
make an immediate decision or choose to re-check the image.  
One system produced the same number of false alarms and 
misses. The second system was prone to false alarms, and the 
third was a miss-prone system.   
Based on prior research, the frequency of re-checking was 
expected to depend on the predictive values of the two types 
of cues, with lower values leading to more re-checks (Manzey 
et al., 2014). Due to earlier findings of asymmetry, we 
predicted that a low NPV would increase re-checks of ‘no 
target’ cues, while a low PPV should lead to both more re-
checks of ‘target’ cues and ‘no target’ cues (e.g. Meyer et al., 
2013).  
Variation of risk level was based on the theory of Renn 
(2012) who stated that perception of risk is influenced by the 
source of the risk and the risk situation. Accordingly, we 
framed the high risk condition as cancer screening (source of 
risk) with an alarm system (situation). In the low risk 
condition, the same task was indicated as tissue categorization 
of different cells with the help of a decision aid. 
In line with theoretical assumptions, we expected re-check 
frequencies to vary as a function of risk (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997). A higher risk level should lead to more re-
checks. Additionally, we predicted that the asymmetry bias 
would be moderated by the level of risk (Wiczorek & 
Onnasch, 2012). Effects of PPV on the re-checking of both 
‘target’ cues and ‘no target’ cues should only manifest 
themselves in the high risk condition. For the low risk 
condition, PPV should only influence the re-checking of 
‘target’ cues. 
Thus, participants with all three systems should re-check 
more cues in the high risk condition than in the low risk 
condition. Those working with the neutral system were 
expected to re-check both types of cues with the same 
frequency because of the equality of PPV and NPV. With the 
miss-prone system ‘no target’ cues should be re-checked more 
often than ‘target’ cues because of the lower NPV. We 
expected participants in the false alarm-prone condition to 
differentiate their behavior according to their risk condition. 
Under high risk, the asymmetry bias should arise, so that 
participants will re-check both the ‘target’ cues and the ‘no 
target’ cues. In contrast, the bias was expected to disappear in 
the low risk condition, and ‘target’ cues should be re-checked 
more often than ‘no target’ cues as a reaction to low PPV.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Seventy-two students at Ben-Gurion University of the 
Negev and at Tel Aviv University participated in the study. 
Experiments were conducted in groups of up to 8 people. 
Simulation environment  
Participants conducted a visual search task on 19” screens. 
They saw a blurry picture containing nine digits in three rows 
and three columns (see Figure 1). Their task was to decide 
whether the target number 3 was present and to press the 
corresponding button. This task was supported by a cuing 
system. The system indicated its diagnoses with different 
colored horizontal bars under the picture and with written 
messages. Below the picture were two buttons for the two 
decision options - ‘target’ and ‘no target’. After one second, 
the image disappeared and a third button was presented, 
labeled ‘re-check’. If participants were uncertain about their 
response, they could click on the ‘re-check’ button and revisit 
the picture for another 3 seconds before making their final 
decision. After clicking one of the two decision buttons, a new 
image appeared. Participants received 10 points for every 
correct decision, and they lost 10 points for every wrong 
decision. Re-checking was penalized by the reduction of 2 
points. At the end of the experiments, participants could 
receive a bonus payment, based on the number of points 
collected during the experimental blocks.  
Design 
The study consisted of a 2 (Risk Framing) x 3 (Cuing 
System) x 2 (Type of Cue) x 2 (Block) design with repeated 
measures on the third and fourth factor. In the high risk 
condition, the cuing system was framed as an alarm system 
with red and green cues and ‘target’ and ‘no target’ 
indications. The task was introduced as cancer screening. In 
the low risk condition, the systems was described as a decision 
aid, and it provided dark blue and light blue cues with the 
written messages ‘tissue A’ and ‘tissue B’, respectively. The 
task was described as tissue categorization of two different 
types of cells.  
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental screen with stimulus image for a participant 
in the high risk condition. 
 
The type of cue and the corresponding button was either 
‘target’/’tissue A’ to indicated that the image contained the 
number 3, or ‘no target’/’tissue B’, signaling the absence of 
number 3. 
The cuing systems differed with regard to the errors they 
committed. Participants either saw a false alarm-prone, a miss-
prone or a neutral system. The neutral system produced the 
same number of false alarms and misses. Its PPV and NPV 
were 0.8. The false alarm-prone system had a PPV of 0.6 and 
a NPV of 0.8. The miss-prone system had a PPV of 0.8 and a 
NPV of 0.6. The error base rate was 0.5 in all conditions. 
Participants’ behavior was recorded in two consecutive blocks 
to control for potential learning effects. 
Procedure  
After arriving at the lab, participants first signed a consent 
form. They then received standardized instructions on the 
screen. Training and data collection intermitted over the 
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course of four blocks. Participants trained the task without the 
cuing system. The two manual training blocks consisted of 40 
trials each. Both of the two experimental blocks included 80 
trials. In those blocks, participants were supported by one of 
the three systems, either framed as a decision aid or an alarm 
system. Participants’ behavior was recorded. At the end, 
participants were thanked and paid. 
 
RESULTS 
 
We used a multifactorial ANOVA with repeated measures 
to analyze the results. The factors Cuing System and Block 
were not significant. Participants’ re-checking frequencies did 
not change over time. The analysis revealed main effects for 
Risk Framing, F(1,66)=4.23, p<.05, η²p=.06,  and for the Type 
of Cue, F(1,66)=16.75, p<.001, η²p=.2. Re-checking appeared 
more often in the high risk conditions, compared to the low 
risk conditions. In addition, participants re-checked 
significantly more often the ‘no target’/’tissue B’ cues than the 
‘target’/’tissue A’ cues. This indicates greater insecurity with 
‘no target’ cues, compared to ‘target’ cues.  
These main effects were further qualified by two two-way 
interaction effects. The significant interaction Risk Framing x 
Cuing System, F(2,66)=3.14, p<.05, η²p=.09, was caused by 
the percentage of re-checking being highest with the false 
alarm-prone system in the high risk condition and lowest with 
the false alarm-prone system in the low risk condition, while 
the other two systems lead to medium re-checking rates under 
both risk conditions. Percentage of re-checking varied as a 
function of risk only in the false alarm-prone condition. The 
second two-way interaction effect was Risk Framing x Type 
of Cue, F(2,66)=5.26, p<.05, η²p=.07. Over all systems, re-
checking of ‘no target’/’tissue B’ cues increased more under 
high risk, compared to low risk, than did the re-checking 
frequency of ‘target’/’tissue A’ cues. Thus risk had a larger 
effect on the re-checking of ‘no target’/’tissue B’ than on the 
re-checking of ‘target’/’tissue A’ cues. None of the other 
interaction effects was significant. These statistical effects of 
the current study are in line with the predictions made before. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the actual 
re-checking behavior did not completely correspond with our 
predictions.  
 
 
Figure 2. Means of re-checking frequencies (averaged across two 
experimental blocks) for the three alarm systems in the high risk 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 3. Means of re-checking frequencies (averaged across two 
experimental blocks) for the three decision aids in the low risk 
condition. 
 
Participants in the false alarm-prone high risk condition 
frequently re-checked both, ‘target’ and ‘no target’ cues, 
showing an asymmetry effect, where PPV influenced re-
checking of ‘target’ and ‘no target’ cues. As predicted, this 
effect disappeared in the low risk condition. Re-checking was 
done much less. Unlike predicted, no real difference between 
re-checks of ‘target’ cues and ‘no target’ cues was found.  
Participants’ interaction with the miss-prone system under 
the condition of high risk also corresponded with our 
expectations. As a consequence of lower NPV, participants re-
checked the ‘no target’ cues more often than the ‘target’ cues. 
As expected, the pattern in the low risk condition was the 
same. The predicted reduction of re-check frequencies due to 
the lower risk was not found. 
Similar, re-checking with the neutral system did not 
change as a function of risk. More surprisingly however, 
participants under both risk conditions re-checked the ‘no-
target’/’tissue B’ cues more often than the ‘target’/’tissue A’ 
cues, even though PPV and NPV were the same.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the current study should be interpreted with 
caution, and attention should be given to the different effects 
that brought about the overall behavioral pattern.  
Participants’ frequent re-checking of ‘target’ cues and ‘no 
target’ cues, likewise, in the false alarm-prone condition under 
high risk represents a type of asymmetry effect on the level of 
re-check behavior and thus, corresponds to prior findings of 
asymmetry (e.g. Dixon et al., 2007; Meyer, Wiczorek & 
Günzler, 2013; Rice & McCarley, 2011). The disappearance 
of the effect, as well as the strong reduction of re-checking in 
the low risk condition, provide evidence for the proposed 
moderation of the asymmetry effect through the level of 
perceived risk. 
In the neutral group under high risk, the differences 
between re-checking frequencies for ‘target’ cues and ‘no 
target’ cues are not in line with predictions. Because the 
system had the same PPV and NPV, re-checking rates were 
predicted to be similar for both types of cues. The 
disproportion, in favor of the more frequent re-checking of ‘no 
target’ cues, might be the result of the vulnerability of the 
reliance discussed earlier. While a PPV of 0.8 is interpreted as 
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sufficient, a NPV of 0.8 might already be seen as too low, 
because missing a critical event is perceived as more 
problematic than making a commission error and erroneously 
reacting to an alarm. Similar effects have been found before in 
a way that few reduction of high NPV led to an over 
proportionally strong reduction in reliance (Manzey et al., 
2014).  
The unexpected difference between re-check frequencies 
for ‘tissue A’ and ‘tissue B’ cues in the neutral low risk 
condition may be due to the design we used. The stimulus 
material used in the current study may have interfered with the 
risk manipulation in the low risk condition. Whereas the cues 
(blue and light blue), as well as the labels (‘tissue A’ and 
‘tissue’ B’), were chosen to make both options identical, the 
images differed with regard to one, maybe important detail. 
One type of image contained the number three, the other did 
not. While we framed the task as a categorization task, the 
stimulus material we used still corresponded to a signal 
detection task. Thus, the more frequent re-checks of the target 
absent images may represent the same aversion to commit 
omission errors described above.  
However, it is not clear, why variation of risk did not 
reduce overall re-checking, either in the miss-prone or in the 
neutral condition. One possible explanation is that risk not 
only moderated the asymmetry effect, but that the effect of 
risk is also moderated by system characteristics. Only 
participants working with false alarm-prone systems were 
sensitive to a variation of the risk.  
Further research is needed to answer the remaining open 
questions. The variation of risk conditions should be repeated 
with stimulus material consistent with the task. In addition, 
future studies have to design the systems with regard to a 
potential omission avoidance bias. A neutral system should 
have predictive values of at least 0.95 (see Meyer et al., 2013), 
to prevent confounding the two possible explanations for the 
asymmetry effect (i.e. impact of false alarms vs. vulnerability 
of reliance). 
Results of the current study show the existence of an 
asymmetry bias also on the level of re-check frequencies. 
However, a more complex analysis of response frequencies, 
including also analyses of direct compliance and direct 
reliance, in addition to re-checks is needed to complete the 
picture.  
This study does not provide a definite answer to the 
question whether the asymmetry effect is due to a 
disproportionally strong weighting of false alarms compared 
to misses or whether it is the result of a greater vulnerability of 
reliance, due to the tendency to avoid misses of critical events. 
However, it provides evidence in favor of the latter 
explanation, because ‘no target’ cues were re-checked more 
often. 
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